This paper presents algorithms for non-zero sum nonlinear constrained dynamic games with full information. Such problems emerge when multiple players with action constraints and differing objectives interact with the same dynamic system. They model a wide range of applications including economics, defense, and energy systems. We show how to exploit the temporal structure in projected gradient and Douglas-Rachford (DR) splitting methods. The resulting algorithms converge locally to open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE) at linear rates. Furthermore, we extend stagewise Newton method to find a local feedback policy around an OLNE. In the of linear dynamics and polyhedral constraints, we show that this local feedback controller is an approximated feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE). Numerical examples are provided.
Introduction
This paper describes numerical algorithms for finite-horizon, constrained, discrete-time dynamic games with full information. In this setup, agents with different objectives but coupled constraints choose inputs to a dynamic system. Due to coupling in the constraints, we examine generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). The formulation and all results in this paper automatically apply to standard Nash equilibrium problems when the action constraints are not coupled. The dynamic system can be naturally discrete-time or emerge from discretization of a differential game [1] [2] [3] [4] . Dynamic games have many applications including pursuitevasion [5] , active-defense [6, 7] , economics [8] and the smart grid [9] . Despite a wide array of applications, the computational methods for dynamic games are considerably less developed than the single-agent case of optimal control. Our previous work [10] extended stagewise Newton algorithm and differential dynamic programming (DDP), which originated from single-agent optimal control, to unconstrained non-zero-sum dynamic games. We proved that the methods converge quadratically to an open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE), the resulting closed-loop policies are local feedback O(ε 2 )-Nash equilibria (FNEs), and that both algorithms enjoyed a linear complexity with respect to the horizon. This paper generalizes [10] to the case of constrained dynamic games.
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Below we review generalized Nash equilibrium problems and their relation to variational inequalities. Additionally, we describe projected gradient and Douglas-Rachford splitting methods, which can solve variational inequalities (VI) problems. For a more detailed review of relevant game theory literature, see [10] .
General Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) study games with constraints that couple different players' strategies [11] . For games with continuous variables, necessary conditions for the solution of a GNEP can be formulated as a variational inequality (VI). These inequalities can be solved via generic VI methods or classic feasibility problem methods, such as Newton's method [12] or others [13] . First order VI methods require calculation of gradients, while second order methods require inverting Hessian matrices. Naïve implementations of these calculations respectively require O(T 2 ) and O(T 3 ) steps, where T is the number of stages. Our stagewise Newton method from [10] exploits dynamic structure to compute gradients, Hessians, and inverse Hessians with O(T ) complexity. Below, we describe two VI algorithms in greater detail.
Projected gradient algorithms alternate between taking gradient descent steps and projecting onto constraints. They have been well studied for optimization [14] and variational inequality (VI) problems [15] , and proven to converge linearly in both cases. This paper describes how the projected gradient method can be applied to constrained dynamic games, including convergence conditions and convergence rate of the algorithm. Douglas-Rachford (DR) splitting methods alternate between solving two VI problems when applied to constrained game problems. Typically one problem corresponds to an unconstrained optimization or game problem, while the other corresponds to projection onto constraints [15] . As with the projected gradient method, the DR method converges linearly [16] . In optimization, the DR method is closely related to the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) [17] and has been extended to (single-agent) optimal control problems [18, 19] .
Our Contribution
We describe efficient implementations of projected gradient and Douglas-Rachford splitting methods for computing OLNEs of constrained dynamic games. In both cases, we show how to exploit temporal structure to achieve iterations of O(T ) complexity. Finally, we adapted the stagewise Newton to solve for a feedback policy around OLNE trajectories. In the case of games with linear dynamics and polyhedral constraints, we show that it is an approximate (generalized) feedback Nash equilibrium.
Paper Outline
The paper can be divided into three major parts. The first part, Section 2, describes the problem formulations and solution concepts. The second part, Section 3 on the projected gradient method and Section 4 on the Douglas-Rachford splitting method, describe methods for computing local OLNE solutions. The third part focuses on local feedback Nash equilibria. It includes Section 5, which lays the groundwork, and Section 6, which analyzes local FNE for constrained dynamic games. Numerical examples are offered in Section 7 and future extensions discussed in Section 8.
Problem Formulations and Solution Concepts
We introduce some standard notation, formulate the constrained dynamic game problems, and introduce the associated solution concepts.
Dynamic and Static Game Formulation
The main problem of interest is a constrained, deterministic, full-information dynamic game with N players of the form below. 
Subject to dynamic constraints f k (·) and extra constraints g n,k (·) s.t. x k+1 = f k (x k , u :,k ) (2a) g k (x k , u :,k ) ≤ 0, (2b) x t is fixed.
(2c) k = t,t + 1, . . . , T − 1.
(2d)
Here, 0 ≤ t ≤ T is the starting point for a game. When t = 0, we call it the full game, and t > 0, a subgame t. Here, the state of the system at time k is denoted by x k ∈ R n x . Player n's action at time k is given by u n,k ∈ R n un . The vector of all players' actions at time k is denoted u :,k = [u 1,k , u 2,k , . . . , u N,k ] ∈ R n u . The cost for player n at time k is c n,k (x k , u :,k ). This encodes the fact that the cost for each player can depend on the actions of all the players. We assume that the costs are twice differentiable with locally Lipschitz Hessians.
In later analysis, some other notation is helpful. The actions of player n from time t to T in a vector is denoted u n,t: = [u n,t , u n,t+1 , . . . , u n,T ] . The vector of actions other than those of player n from time t to T is denoted by u −n,t: = [u 1,t: , . . . , u n−1,t: , u n+1,t: , . . . , u N,t: ] . The vector of states from time t to T is denoted
while the vector of all players' actions from t to T is given by u :,t: = [u 1,t: , u 2,t: , . . . , u N,t: ] . x, u denote all states and actions collected over all time in a vector.
We denote the set of trajectories [x :,t: , u :,t: ] satisfying the dynamic constraint with given x t as D t (x t ) and the extra constraints G t (x t ). Feasible sets of state and actions are denoted X t (x t ) and U t (x t ) for subgame t. The subscript t or initial condition x 0 can be suppressed later in this paper indicating values for the full game.
Note that the dynamics are deterministic, the cost for each player in a subgame can be expressed as a function of all following actions and given state x t , i.e., J n,t (x t , u :,t: ). The dynamics are implicitly substituted to eliminate x when we use such notation. Problem 1 can be written in an equivalent static game form for ease of notation and analysis.
Problem 2 Static form of game Problem 1
A static form equivalent to Problem 1 is denoted min u n,t:
Solution Concept of Games
We focus on local open-loop Nash equilibria and feedback Nash equilibria in this paper. Technically, we are studying generalized Nash equilibria, since players' actions can be coupled in the constraints [20] . However, for simplicity, we will refer to them as Nash equilibria.
Definition 1 (Local) open-loop Nash equilibrium
An open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) for subgame t of problem 1 and 2 with one specific state x t is a set of actions u :,t:
Furthermore, if (4) only holds for u n,t: ∈ U n,t (x t ) in a neighborhood of u n,t: , it is called a local open-loop Nash equilibrium (local-OLNE).
Problem 1 and Problem 2 are equivalent in terms of a local OLNE. An OLNE does not dynamically adjust if the state changes. In contrast, a feedback Nash equilibrium for dynamic games Problem 1 requires players to be able to measure the state x k at each step and execute a step-by-step policy u :,k = φ :,k (x k ) to account for changes in the state. FNE has the valuable property of being subgame perfect [21] .
Definition 2 (Local) feedback Nash equilibrium A collection of feedback policies u n,k = φ n,k (x k ), withū n,k = φ * n,k (x k ) ∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, ∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} is said to be a feedback Nash equilibrium of the full game if no player can benefit from changing their policy unilaterally for any subgame t, i.e., J n,t (x t , φ :,t: ) ≤ J n,t (x t , [φ n,t: , φ −n,t: ]), ∀t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T }, (5) where J n,t (x t , φ :,t: ) indicates the total cost of player n when all players follow policy φ :,t: for subgame t. All policies should be compatible with the constraints. Furthermone, if (5) only holds around [x,ū] ∈ D ∩ G and the resulting trajectories remain in a neighborhood of [x,ū], it is called a local feedback Nash equilibrium (local-FNE). This definition only applies to Problem 1 because Problem 2 does not have explicit state information. In this definition, [x,ū] must be an OLNE since (5) could be violated atx t otherwise. Thus, we focus on local FNEs that are built around OLNEs in this paper. Ideally, an FNE is solved via the Bellman recursion, which originated from optimal control problems, and was extended to dynamic games [21, 22] . Instead of solving the minimizing action at each stage, equilibrium of stagewise games are computed via the following recursion
Here V n,k (x k ) and Q n,k (x k , u :,k ) are referred to as equilibrium value functions for player n at time step k. Note that (6c) defines a parametric static game in terms of the u :,k variable at step k and parameterized by x k . For dynamic games with quadratic costs, linear dynamics and polyhedral constraints, the analytical FNE can be obtained in theory as described in Section 5 and Appendix B. In general, this backward recursion is intractable, so we focus on solving it approximately around an OLNE trajectory. Note that the game ends at k = T , and setting V n,T +1 (x T +1 ) = 0 is only for ease of notation and that by construction, V * n,t (x t ) = J n,t (x t , φ * :,t: ) for t = 0, . . . , T .
Variational Inequality (VI) Formulation
For continuous-variable games, variational inequalities (VIs) give a necessary condition for the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium problems [15] . We describe the VI formulation of the full game, which starts at t = 0. The formulation for games starting at t ≥ 1 is simular. We omit the dependency on x 0 , stack all of the gradient vector .
Note that J (u) has the same dimension as u. When the dependence on x 0 must be emphasized, we denote the corresponding function by J (x 0 , u). The VI formulation of the full game, Problem 2, is as following.
Problem 3 VI formulation of static game
Note that u is the solution of VI formulation is only necessary to u being a local OLNE to Problem 2. To ensure sufficiency, it should also be checked if each player's action is a local minimizer to their objective. Two sufficient conditions for player n's cost to be locally minimized are 1) ∂ J n ∂ u n,: (u ) = 0 and 2) ∂ J n ∂ u n,: (u ) = 0 and J n (u n,: ) is locally convex. If u is a local minimizer for all players, then it is also a local OLNE solution to 2. We refer to this procedure as playerwise local minimizer check.
Sufficient Conditions for Existence of Solutions
A commonly applicable sufficient condition for a solution of the VI problem to exist is that J (u) is locally strongly monotone and U is convex. Another sufficient condition is that, U is compact convex and J (u) is continuous on U [15] . In the case if J n (x 0 , u) is convex w.r.t. u n,: , the playerwise local minimizer check described above is satisfied for all players, and therefore the game has an OLNE solution. If J (x 0 , u) is continuous in x 0 (which is guaranteed by our differentiability assumption) and locally strongly monotone with respect to u, the dynamic games can be solved for all states near x t . This guarantees the existence of a local FNE.
The Projected Gradient Method
The projected gradient method for monotone VI problems was explained in details in [15] . We briefly describe the method and its basic application to Problem 3, which helps find an OLNE for Problem 2. We show how this leads to an algorithm for constrained dynamic games.
Projected Gradient Method for VI
The projection algorithm follows an iterative update
where ρ is a step size and Π is the projection operator. The algorithm converges linearly with constant (1+ρ 2 L 2 −2ρ µ) when J (u) is µ-strongly monotone, L-Lipschitz, i.e.,
and that ρL 2 ≤ 2µ [15] . There exists a small ρ that guarantees the linear convergence, although smaller ρ leads to slower convergence. To apply the projection method to constrained dynamic games, we need procedures to compute the gradient J (u) and the projection onto U .
Given feasibleū andx such that [x,ū] ∈ D, the gradient J (ū) can be found efficiently by first performing a backward pass (11) [10] , then extracting and stacking corresponding elements in ∂ J n (u,x 0 ) ∂ u :,k ū
. Ω n,T +1 = 0 (11a)
where A k , B k , M k are derivatives of the dynamics and cost evaluated aroundx,ū defined in (34) in Section 6.
The projection onto U requires solving a constrained optimal control problem with quadratic step costs, which can be solved via classic optimal control methods [23] . 
The notation J is overloaded and is different from that of the formulations of Problem 1 and 2. Note that a trajectory found via projected gradient method is a solution to the VI problem but not necessarily the game. A playerwise local minimizer check needs to be done as discussed in Section 2.3. We summarize the projected gradient method in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Projected Gradient Method for Constrained Dynamic Games
Generate an initial trajectory of actionsū loop Compute gradient J (ū) according to (11) Updateū ←ū − ρJ (ū) Solve Problem 4 aroundū, assign the solution to u Compareū and u to check convergence Setū ← u end loop Perform convexity check forū
The Douglas-Rachford Operator Splitting Method
This section concerns with solving an OLNE with the Douglas-Rachford splitting method, which is an alternative to the projected gradient method. The DR splitting method, in its most general form, finds the vector w that solves a monotone inclusion problem of the form
where Θ and Φ are two maximally monotone operators in this section. The DR algorithm is defined by the iteration
R Θ := 2r Θ − I is called the reflected resolvent of Θ where r Θ is the resolvent of Θ. The same notation applies for operator Φ. α is a constant such that α ∈ (0, 1). The key steps are solving for the two operators' resolvents, which we elaborate in the case of constrained dynamic games in this section. The DR splitting method has been proven to converge linearly in cases when at least one operator has stronger properties such as strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity. See [16] for more details.
VI Reformulation of Static Game with States
For ease of notation we interpret [x, u] as a column vector vertically stacking x and u in this section. We create an extended gradient J xu ([x, u]) prepending n x of zeros in front of J (u), i.e.,
and use it to reformulate Problem 3 equivalently as Problem 5 VI formulation of static game with extended gradient
Problem 5 is equivalent to an inclusion problem, when D and G are convex and J xu is strongly monotone as explained in Appendix A.1. Note that x is also a decision variable in this formulation. This VI problem can also be formulated as an inclusion problem such that we can apply the DR-splitting method.
Problem 6 Inclusion problem form of the static game Problem 2
where N D and N G indicate the normal cone operators of N and G, and η is a positive regularization constant. The smaller the η, the more regularized the problems are, but the slower the convergence would be. η should be tuned so that the relevant problems in Section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are either strongly convex of monotone for better solvability. Note that there are three adding operators in Problem 6, in contrast to (13) which has only two. We can single out any one operator and combine the other two to form an inclusion problem with two adding operators and apply the DR algorithm. The algorithm requires alternately solving two problems that are the resolvents of different operators. Which combination to chose ultimately depends on which resolvents are easier to solve, which varies with the specific dynamic game and available solvers. Ideally, when both resolvents are analytically solvable, the DR algorithm is preferred.
We summarize the implementation of the DR splitting in Algorithm 2 and elaborate the optimization/game problems derived from the resolvents later in this section. We use y, z to indicate a nominal trajectory that follows the same convention as x, u. The notation J is overloaded to indicate costs for these different resolvent problems. For details regarding how the problems are derived from resolvents, see Appendix A.2.
Singling out N G
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out N G
The resolvent of ηJ xu + N D corresponds to solving a regularized, unconstrained dynamic game and the resolvent of N G is the projection onto G. 
Solve the second problem in the selected section with y, z, assign the resulting trajectory tox,ũ
Reset the intermediate valuesx,ũ and y, z
Compute weighted average
Check for convergence withx,ū andx,ũ end loop Problem 7 Regularized unconstrained dynamic game around nominal trajectory y, z min u n,:
This problem can be solved via our previously proposed stagewise Newton or DDP methods with linear complexity in T and quadratic convergence [10] .
Problem 8 Projection of a nominal trajectory y, z onto the extra constraints set
When the extra constraints sets are convex at each stage, this projection is equivalent to solving the projection onto a convex set at each stage.
Singling out N D
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out N D
The resolvent of ηJ xu + N G corresponds to solving a series of regularized, constrained static games and the resolvent of N D is the projection onto D, which is an optimal control problem.
Problem 9 Regularized constrained static games around nominal trajectory y, z min
Note that the objectives are not coupled cross time, therefore this is equivalent to solving T + 1 constrained static games, which can be solved via solving the KKT conditions [20] or other static game methods. Note that there is an additional player with decision variable x k at each stage.
Problem 10 Projection of a nominal trajectory y, z onto the dynamics
This is an optimal control problem with quadratic step cost, which can be solved via classic optimal control methods [24] .
Singling out ηJ xu
Problem 6 becomes the following when singling out ηJ xu
The resolvent of N D + N G corresponds to solving a constrained optimal control problem and the resolvent of J xu is a series of unconstrained optimization.
Problem 11
Constrained optimal control around nominal trajectory y, z
This is an constrained optimal control problem with quadratic step cost, which can be solved via classic optimal control methods [24] .
Problem 12
Regularized unconstrained games around a nominal trajectory y, z min
Because the objectives are not coupled cross time, this becomes T + 1 unconstrained static games, which can be solved via classic VI methods. Similar to Problem 9, an additional player with decision variable x k at each stage is added.
Parametric Games and Feedback Equilibria
Solving a parametric game is the backbone of solving an explicit feedback Nash equilibrium of a game. We briefly describe the results of analytically solvable parametric games and dynamic games in this section. Section 5.1 explains the result for linear equality constrained quadratic parametric games, which is directly applied to stagewise Newton method in Section 6. Section 5.2 describes the form of feedback equilibrium of linearly constrained quadratic dynamic games, which is piecewise affine but can be exponentially complex. We assume each player's cost function J n (x, u) is continuous and strictly convex throughout this section.
The detailed development of the results can be found in the Appendix B, which is extending the analytical solution of linearly constrained, quadratic objective optimization and optimal control in Chapter 7 of [23] .
Linear Equality Constrained Quadratic Parametric Game
Problem 13 is a basic form that is encountered when approximating a constrained dynamic game, where u = [u 1 , u 2 , ..., u N , ] collects all players' action and x is a vector parameter. An FNE policy u = φ (x) is desired. This game has an explicit analytical solution with simple assumptions.
Problem 13 Linear equality constrained quadratic parametric game
The following lemma describes its solution.
Lemma 1 Given playerwise convexity of objective functions, i.e., Γ uu n are positive definite, Problem 13 has a unique affine feedback Nash equilibrium as in (31a) if F is invertible and S has full row rank.
Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
A linearly constrained quadratic dynamic game is formulated as following. It is one of the most complicated form of dynamic games of which we can acquire analytical solution in theory.
Problem 14 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
This problem can be viewed as a static game in u parameterized by x. As developed in detail in Appendix B, the explicit FNE solution found via Bellman recursion to this problem is a piecewise affine policy, with polyhedral domains, and the value functions are piecewise quadratic. However, the required number of polyhedral domains on the space X k can grow exponentially, causing the procedure to be computationally prohibiting. It is reasonable to believe that the feedback Nash equilibrium of general constrained dynamic games can be more complex. This fact drives us to seek local FNE.
Local Feedback Equilibrium
OLNEs solved via projected gradient or DR splitting might not be applicable to systems with noise. Thus, we aim to find a local feedback policy around the OLNE that can accommodate disturbances of the system to a certain degree. As discussed above, even for linear-quadratic dynamic games with polyhedral constraints, explicit feedback strategies can require exponential computational complexity. In this section, we describe a simplified strategy based on linearly constrained problems. When the constraints are polyhedral, we prove that the feedback policy is indeed a local O(ε 2 )−FNE.
Stagewise Newton Method for Local Feedback Policy
We introduce the stagewise Newton method for computing a local feedback policy for Problem 1. The method is based on the stagewise Newton method for unconstrained dynamic games from our previous work [10] . The key difference is that, at each step, an approximated linear equality constrained quadratic game Problem 13 is solved, instead of the unconstrained quadratic game in [10] .
Suppose a trajectoryx,ū has been found along with the active constraints at each step. The set of indices of active constraints in g k (x k ,ū :,k ) is denotedā k , ∀k and we use gā k (x k , u :,k ) to indicate the active constraints atx,ū, therefore gā k (x k ,ū :,k ) = 0. We inherit the following notation of derivatives for stagewise Newton method from [10] .
We introduce new notation related to the derivatives of the active constraints a k , ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T }.
We can form a local linear-quadratic approximation that is still analytically solvable via dynamic programming as following.
Problem 15 Linear-quadratic approximation to Problem 1 min u n,:
where the states of the dynamic game are given by δ x k and ∆x k as
The following lemma describes the solution to Problem 15.
Lemma 2
The equilibrium value functions found via the Bellman recursion (6) for the dynamic game Problem (15) are denoted as Vū n,k (·) and Qū n,k (·, ·), which can be expressed as
where the matrices Λ n,k , Γ n,k , and Ω n,k can be computed in a backward pass, which also finds a local feedback policy of the form δ u :,k = K k δ x k + s k around this trajectory.
The matrices Λ n,k , Γ n,k , and Ω n,k in (38) are computed recursively by Λ n,T +1 = 0, Ω n,T +1 = 0, and
for k = T, T − 1, . . . , 0.
Proof. The stagewise Newton method for unconstrained dynamic game and its solution was proved in [10] . The only difference in the dynamic programming procedure for Problem 15 is that an equality constrained static quadratic game is solved at each time step, resulting in different expressions for the feedback parameters K k and s k , which are justified by the solution of Problem 13. 2
Note that the differential dynamic programming (DDP) method for unconstrained dynamic games [10] can be adapted to constrained games in a similar fashion, for the sake of completeness of generalizing our previous work. As in the unconstrained dynamic game case, DDP and stagewise Newton do not manifest obvious advantages over each other.
Remarks on the Feedback Policy by Stagewise Newton Method
Stagewise Newton method solves a linear equality constrained quadratic dynamic game that approximates Problem 1 aroundx,ū and finds a local feedback policy. Without constraints g k (x k , u :,k ), i.e., setting S k = 0,W k = 0, p k = 0, the method reduces to the unconstrained version of stagewise Newton method [10] . However, unlike its counterpart for unconstrained game, because of the introduction of constraints, the policy found might not be feasible, therefore we cannot perform the iterative process as in [10] . We consider in this paper the case whenx,ū is an OLNE and the feedback policy found by one backward pass of the stagewise Newton method. In this case,ū will be will be a fixed-point of the Newton iteration and the feedback policy simplifies to δ u :,k = K k δ x k . Furthermore, the matrices are computed in O(T ) complexity. The possibility of infeasible policy remains and is overcome with tightened constraints as in Section 6.3.
The proposed algorithm neglects the inactive constraints. A problem arises, in that deviations in the state can cause these neglected constraints to become violated. A simple method to ensure feasibility is to tighten the inequality constraints, as is common in model predictive control [23] . We will see below that in the case of polyhedral constraints, the feedback policy is indeed an local O(ε 2 )-FNE.
Problems with Polyhedral Constraints
In this section, we introduce a special class of dynamic problems, restricting to affine dynamics and polyhedral constraints, such that the stagewise Newton method can be utilized to find a local O(ε 2 )-FNE for a partially tightened problem (defined below). We first introduce a fully tightened version of a polyhedrally constrained linear dynamic game Problem 16 Game with tightened polyhedral constraints min u n,:
Here γ k > 0 are vectors used to tighten the inequality constraints. As above, say thatx,ū is an OLNE trajectory. We use superscriptsā and¯i to denote values associated with active and inactive constraints onx andū. If we find a local feedback policy using the stagewise Newton method, it can be shown that it is feasible for the following partially tightened problem:
Problem 17 Game with partially tightened polyhedral constraints min u n,:
Recall that the dynamics, constraints, and control law are all affine. Thus, when a local variation of the state x k −x = ε happens with a sufficiently small ε, the trajectories remain feasible.
The next theorem summarizes this local feedback Nash equilibrium result. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 1 There exists a sufficiently small ε, such that if x t −x t ≤ ε, the OLNEū,x, active/inactive constraints and local feedback policy φ :,k (x k ) = K k x k + s k found for Problem 16, is a local feedback O(ε 2 )-Nash equilibrium for Problem 17:
for any ψ n,: such that the resulting trajectories are feasible for (41) and remain in a neighborhood of [x,ū].
Numerical Examples
We demonstrate the approximated local feedback Nash equilibrium around an OLNE with a common-property fishery resource problem and Douglas-Rachford algorithm with a linear quadratic games with analytically projectable convex constraints.
A Common-Property Fishery Resource Problem
The common-property fishery game was considered in Chapter 13, [2] , which is a classic renewable resource manage problem that dates back to 1970s. The analysis in [2] settled at the conclusion that efficient players will drive some opponents out of the competition and maintain at the bionomic equilibrium with zero sustained economic rent. We demonstrate the dynamic equilibrium of two players jointly utilize the resource for a given period of time.
The game is discretized. Scalars x k and u 1,k , u 2,k denote the biomass of fish and fishing effort of two players. The fishing effort is constrained by 0 ≤ u n,k ≤ u max n . The dynamics of the system from time 0 to T is given by
where the natural growth rate g(x k ) is
h is half the maximal biomass the environment can sustain and r is the maximal growth rate which happens when x k = h. q n is the catchability coefficient for player n. w k is a I.I.D. Gaussian noise we injected for simulating a noisy system.
Step profit of each player is modeled as c n,k (x k , u :,k ) = (p n q n x k − e n ) u n,k dt
where p n is the unit price of landed fish and e n is the unit cost of effort. Fig. 1 . OLNE of projected gradient iterations. 10 trajectories were sampled from 1,000 iterations and shown in Fig. 1 with more transparent curves indicating earlier trajectories in the iteration.
As can be seen, both players would wait at the beginning for the level of fish biomass to rise even after it passes their bionomic equilibria, since they are managing the resource on a longer term. Two players' effort stabilizes in the middle section, which we believe to be the infinite horizon equilibrium for the game, which is not within the scope of this paper. In the end, player 1 does not care about longer term profit, so they maximize the effort. Player 2 would like to keep the biomass further away their bionomic equilibrium before the final dash, so they reduced effort from time 80 to around 93.
Constants chosen are chosen in favor of player 1. The turnpike for a player is the most profitable level of fish biomass if the player is managing the resource alone. And the bionomic equilibrium for a player is the minimal fish biomass that a player can turn a profit.
We first applied the projected gradient method with stepsize 0.01 for 1,000 iterations on the deterministic system (neglecting w k ), finding the OLNE shown in Fig. 1 . The cumulative profit and convergence of actions is summarized in Fig 2. We further applied the stagewise Newton method, found the local feedback Nash equilibrium and implemented it for the noisy system, setting the variance of zero-mean Gaussian noise w k to E{w 2 k } = 2. The comparison between OLNE and FNE for noisy system is shown in Fig. 3 .
Linear Quadratic Game with Convex Constraints
When a dynamic linear-quadratic(LQ) game has an convex constraint set onto which, the projection is analytically solvable, both problems in Section 4.2 can be analytically solved and the Douglas-Rachfor splitting method is preferred.
We demonstrate the DR splitting method on a 2-D locomotion problem with N = 3 players. Each player directly controls its own location. The system state x k ∈ R 6 contains N sets of 2-D coordinates of each player and action u n,k ∈ R 2 for each players. We use x n,k to denote player n's coordinate Fig. 2 . Cumulative profit and convergence. The game is formulated favoring player 1, it is not surprising that over iterations, player 1's profit increases while player 2's decreases as in Fig. 2(a) . Fig. 2(b) shows the distance to the final OLNE as the iteration progresses, which fits a typical linear convergence pattern. Fig. 3 . Local OLNE and FNE for noisy system. Fig. 3(a) shows if the OLNE is blindly applied, the biomass is susceptible to the noise and deviates from the OLNE biomass trajectory. Fig. 3(b) shows the correctional effect of a local FNE with erratic fishing efforts but keeping the biomass smoother and closer to the deterministic OLNE.
at step k, naturally we have x k = [x 1,k , x 2,k , x 3,k ], where the variables are all column vectors. The dynamics is simply
where I 6 is a 6 × 6 identity matrix. The initial position x 0 and each players target position x t n are known. Each player's action is subject to a magnitude constraint u n,k ≤ u max n . The cost of each player consists of two parts, reaching to the target and conserving its own energy. It is also required that all three players should meet at k = 5, i.e., x 1,5 = x 2,5 = x 3,5 , which makes the problem a coupled dynamic game problem rather than 3 separated optimal control problems. The particular constraint also causes the projected gradient method or Algorithm 1, if applied to the problem at hand, to require solving a constrained optimal control problem in each iteration, which needs another iterative procedure. The DR splitting on the other hands, presents two analytically solvable subproblems. In particular, the corresponding Problem 7 is solved via stagewise Newton for unconstrained game [10] and Problem 8 becomes a simple projection onto u n,k ≤ u max n . Fig. 4 . Douglas-Rachford splitting for dynamic LQ game with convex constraints. 11 trajectories were sampled from 10,000 iterations and shown in Fig. 4(a) with more transparent curves indicating earlier trajectories in the iteration. The rendezvous point changed over iteration and all players go straight to target afterwards. Fig. 4(b) shows the distance to the final OLNE as the iteration progresses, which is proof that the algorithm converges. 
We applied the DR splitting method with the splitting scheme in Section 4.2. We found η = 10 −4 and α = 0.5 produced stable iteration and solution. 10 4 iterations were performed and shown in Fig. 4 .
Conclusion and Extensions
We demonstrated how the projected gradient method and the Douglas-Rachford algorithm can be used to compute open-loop Nash equilibrium of constrained dynamic games. These algorithms converge locally with a linear rate, and our algorithms require linear iteration complexity in the horizon. We showed how the OLNE solutions computed from these methods can be combined with the stagewise Newton method to find a local feedback strategy. In the case of polyhedrally constrained games with linear dynamics, was saw that this feedback policy provides an approximate feedback Nash equilibrium. The approximation properties of this feedback policy for more general nonlinearly constrained games is worth further study. Another promising direction would be to utilize methods from model predictive control to compute approximate feedback equilibria.
A Auxiliary Proofs

A.1 Problem 5 is Equivalent Problem 6
Because the normal cone of intersections of convex sets is equal to the sum of normal cones of the convex sets [25] , the inclusion problem Problem 6 is equivalent to
According to the definition of normal cone
which is the VI problem Problem 5.
When J xu is strongly monotone, D and G are convex, J xu , N G and N D are all maximally monotone operators. Because adding operators preserve maximal monotonicity, so we can apply DR splitting algorithm to Problem 6.
A.2 Resolvents of Operators in Problem 6
The resolvent of a set-valued/single-valued monotone map Φ is defined by
which is single-valued and non-expansive [15] .
A.2.1 Resolvent of the normal cone of a convex set
Suppose we have a convex set X . Following the definition, the resolvent of N X (x)
which is equivalent to
This VI problem is equivalent to the optimization of a pro-
Therefore the resolvent of a normal cone of a convex set is the projection onto the convex set. This justifies Problem 8 and 10.
A.2.2 Resolvent of a gradient vector
We study the resolvent of the gradient operator ηJ (u) of a game as in (7) . Suppose u = r ηJ (x), equivalently we have
Consider a static game problem
whose Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of
which is equivalent to (A.9a). Therefore, the resolvent is equivalent to the solution of a static game.
Based on the arguement of Section A.2.1 and A.2.2, the subproblems of Section 4 can be justified.
A.3 Generative Cone Condition to Linear Inequalities
Lemma 3 A generative cone condition, where S has full row rank
can be equivalently expressed as
Proof. The generative condition is equivalent to
which is equivalent to Given the SVD decomposition of S
It is easy to check that
Since V 2 x = 0, (A.16) is true. 2
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
First we show that the policy produces feasible trajectories.
Recall that [x,ū] is an OLNE for the equality-constrained problem. Thus, it is a fixed-point of Newton's method, so that the feedback policy has the form: −x t ≤ ε the affine dynamics and polyhedral constraints imply that we must have that u :,k −ū :,k = O(ε) and x k −x k = O(ε) for all k ≥ t. It follows that for sufficiently small ε, the constraint (41d) holds. Thus, the feedback policy produces a feasible trajectory.
Finally, we show that the approximate feedback equilibrium condition, (42), holds. Note that left inequality always holds by construction, so we only need to prove the right inequality.
Fix a player n and a time t ≥ 0. Assume that the other players are using the strategy profile φ −n,t:T . Then, with the strategies of the other players fixed, the policy, ψ n,t: , that minimizes J n,t (x t , [ψ n,t: , φ −n,t: ]) can be computed from the following optimal control problem: min u n,t:T T ∑ k=t c n,k (x k , (u n,k , φ −n,k (x k ))) (A.23a)
The quadraticization around [x,ū] of the optimal control problem (A.23) is exactly the same as that of player n in Problem 17. Thus, when all other players follow the stagewise Newton strategy, the minimizer ψ n,t: should be the same as φ n,t: , since player n will have no incentive to change its strategy on the quadraticized problem. Then, to show that the strategy is an approximate feedback equilibrium, it suffices to show that φ n,t: is approximately optimal. The bound on optimality follows from the general result on parameterized optimization from Lemma 5 below. 2
A.5 Lemmas on Optimization Approximation
In this section, we present Lemma 5 which is used to prove Theorem 1, along with supporting results.
Let f (x, u) be a strongly convex with respect to u in a neighborhood of (x,ū). Assume thatū minimizes f (x, u) with respect to u. Letf (x, u) be its quadratic approximation around the nominal point ( Let φ (x) = K(Ā )x + h(Ā ), whereĀ is the active set of (ū,x). Note that in the game context, this strategy corresponds precisely to the individual players' approximate strategy computed by stagewise Newton methods.
The eventual goal is to show that φ and ψ give similar costs.
As an intermediate result, we show that ψ and ρ give similar costs.
Lemma 4 Let x −x = δ x = ε. Say that f (x, u) has Lipschitz second derivatives and is strongly convex with respect to u in a neighborhood of (x, u). Further assume that C(x) is non-empty for all x in this neighborhood. Then the following bounds hold:
Proof. Note that the first inequality of (A.26) is immediate from the definition of ψ. Thus, we focus on the second inequality.
We will show that ψ(x) − ρ(x) = O(ε). To do this, we will show that both functions are Lipschitz and that φ (x) = ρ(x) =ū.
Note that ψ(x) is the solution to the following VI
By strong convexity and differentiability, ∇ 2 u f (x, u) is positive definite. This implies that for any matrix, B with full column rank, we have that B ∇ 2 u f (x, u)B is also positive definite, and thus has positive determinant. Then general results on perturbed VIs show that ψ(x) must be Lipschitz. See [26] . Furthermore, by construction ψ(x) =ū.
By the same reasoning, we must also have that ρ(x) is Lipschitz and again by construction we have that ρ(x) =ū. It follows that ρ(x) =ū + O(ε). Thus
Now we will prove the upper bound. For compact notation, letũ = ψ(x) and let u = ρ(x). Then we have the approximation:
By optimality ofũ and feasibility of u, we have that
Thus, the proof will be completed if we can bound this term above by O(ε 2 ).
where the partial derivatives are evaluated at (x,ū).
Thus, the desired bound is given by
where the second inequality due to optimality of u for the corresponding affine VI. 2
Now we present the optimization approximation result required for Theorem 1.
Lemma 5 Assume that φ (x) ∈ C(x) and let x −x ≤ ε. Then the following bounds hold.
Proof . The bound on the left holds automatically since φ (x) is feasible and ψ(x) is the corresponding optimal solution.
Specializing Lemma 4 to the case of optimization implies that f (x, ψ(x)) = f (x, ρ(x)) + O(ε 2 ). Thus, it suffices to show that
, let A (θ ) be the active set for (x(θ ), u(θ )), and let I (θ ) be the inactive set. We will show that the active sets only switch a finite number of times.
We claim that for each subsetÂ ⊂ {1, . . . , n c }, the set Θ(Â ) = {θ |A (θ ) =Â } is convex. In particular, Θ(Â ) must be an interval.
Proposition 7.10 of [23] implies that the set of x such that (x, ρ(x)) has active setÂ is a polyhedron. Since each Θ(Â ) is the projection of the intersection of this set with a line, we must have that Θ(Â ) is convex.
Since there are at most 2 n c active sets, it follows that there are sets A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k with k ≤ 2 n c such that Θ(A i ) are intervals that partition [0, 1]. These sets can be arranged so
Let ρ i be the affine strategy corresponding to A i . Then by construction, we have 
Let θ i ∈ Θ(A i ) be some value for which A i is the active set for x(θ i ) =: x i , and let u i be the corresponding optimizer.
Note that x − x(θ i ) ≤ ε. It follows that
Since
Thus, we can get the bound:
An analogous argument argument in the case of A i ⊃ A i+1 shows that the same bound holds.
Plugging (A.32) into (A.30) completes the proof. 2
B Parametric Games and Feedback Equilibrium in Details
This section contains the detailed development for Section 5. Some problem definitions and lemmas are restated so this section is self-contained for ease of reading. We study in this section some basic parametric quadratic games with polyhedral constraints to gain insight of the feedback Nash equilibrium of dynamic games in general. We assume each player's cost function J n (x, u) is continuous and strictly convex throughout this section.
B.1 Linear Equality Constrained Quadratic Parametric Game
Problem 18 is a basic form that is encountered when approximating a constrained dynamic game, where u = [u 1 , u 2 , ..., u N , ] collects all players' action and x is a vector parameter. An FNE policy u = φ (x) is desired. This game has an explicit analytical solution with simple assumptions.
Problem 18 Linear equality constrained quadratic parametric game
Lemma 6 Given playerwise convexity of objective functions, i.e., Γ uu n are positive definite, Problem 18 has a unique affine feedback Nash equilibrium as in (B.2a) if F is invertible and S has full row rank.
Proof. The feedback Nash equilibrium can be solved via solving the KKT conditions of all players [20] . The Lagrangians can be formulated as
Therefore the KKT conditions are 
Plugging this back into the expression for u gives the result. 2
B.2 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Parametric Game
The more generalized problem with inequality constraints are studied in this section. Related problems are studied and the piecewise affine solution was recognized in the variational inequality literature [26, 27] . Our analysis focuses on games which in addition, recognizes the piecewise quadratic value functions. We inherit the notation of u, x, Γ, F, P, H and φ from Section B.1. Such problems serve as a backbone for analyzing FNE for dynamic games when we solve the static game (6c) formed by the state-action value function at a stage.
Problem 19
Linearly constrained quadratic parametric game
We use X and U to indicate the feasible sets of x and u, i.e.,
Note that we do not lose generality without explicit linear equality constraints, since a linear equality constraint can be equivalently formulated with two inequality constraints.
The following lemma and proof offers a descriptive solution to this problem.
Lemma 7
Given playerwise convexity of objective functions, i.e., Γ uu n are positive definite, Problem 19 has a piecewise affine feedback Nash equilibrium u = φ (x) on a finite polyhedral partition of X if and only if F is invertible.
Proof. Assume S has n c rows and we use E n c to indicate the power set of {1, 2, ..., n c }. For a set of indices a ∈ E n c , we use W a , S a and p a to denote picking the corresponding rows.
The solution to Problem 19 can be found via the following procedure.
Pick one element a ∈ E n c , which we suppose to be the indices of active constraints, and solve a linear equality constrained quadratic parametric game with the method in Section B.1 as following
We obtain an affine policy u = K a x + s a and the matrices F, P, H following Lemma 6. Note that we are adding subscribes a to indicate values found associated with the active constraints set of a.
We apply the optimality conditions of VI problem [15] to find the set in which the policy is an equilibrium in terms of x
where cone{S a } means the cone generated by the rows of 
Hence we have found an affine policy u = K a x + s a on a polyhedral region X a := {x | L a x + l a ≤ 0} in X . In the case of X a = / 0, the policy is not an equilibrium.
The procedure can be repeated for all combinations of active constraints, i.e., ∀a ∈ E n c . For any x ∈ X , there exists an equilibrium u (x) and a set of active constraints, therefore x must fall in one of the X a . Because there are a finite number of combinations of active constraints, a finite number of partitions of X with X a and corresponding equilibria policy in each partition can be found. 2
B.3 Linearly Constrained Piecewise Quadratic Parametric Game
We focus on static game problems where each player's cost function J n (x, u) is continuous, strictly convex and piecewise quadratic on a polyhedral partition P. Due to the complexity of the problem, we refrain from obtaining explicit solutions, but study the properties of the solution in this section.
Problem 20 Linearly Constrained Piecewise Quadratic Parametric Game
Assume all players share the same polyhedral partition W.L.O.G and that J (u) is strongly monotone for any given x to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution.
In each partition Z i , the problem reduces to a linearly constrained quadratic parametric game as Problem 19, and F i , P i , H i are inherited from Section B.1, where the subscript i denotes the values in Z i . Suppose there are n P polyhedral partitions, i.e., I = 1, 2, ..., n P . The exact quadratic expression is suppressed. We define an auxiliary problem for each i ∈ I. The following lemma answers the question of how to solve the equilibrium of Problem 20 for a given x with the help of auxiliary problems Problem 21. Proof. Because for any given x there is a unique solution for Problem 20, a local solution is also the global solution.
The equivalent VI problem for finding the local solution to Problem 20 is find u s.t. J (u ) (u − u ) ≥ 0 (B.14a) ∀u in a neighborhood of u (x) (B.14b)
The condition (B.14b) can be expanded to ∀u ∈ ∪ U i (x), ∀i ∈ A p ([x, u (x)]). Due to the same argument that local and global solution are equivalent, this expansion does not change the solution found. Therefore, (B.14) is equivalent to u (x) being the solution to P i simultaneously. We can find the solution of Problem 20 via the solutions of P i . 2
Next we focus on finding the feedback Nash equilibrium in terms of x. Suppose there are a total of n c inequalities. The inequalities defining all partitions can be collected together as .., n s }} contain all possible active polyhedrons and active constraints combinations. We can get rid of the dependency on (x, u), use the index k to indicate different feasible active polyhedrons A p (k) and feasible active constraints A c (k). Finding the sets S p and S c requires studying the structure of the polyhedral partition P, which is not within the scope of this paper.
The next lemma describes the feedback Nash equilibrium of Problem 20.
Lemma 9
Given playerwise convexity of objective functions, i.e., Γ uu n are positive definite, Problem 20 has a piecewise affine feedback Nash equilibrium u = φ (x) on a finite polyhedral partition of X if and only if F i is invertible ∀i ∈ I.
Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 7, we describe a procedure for finding affine policies and their corresponding region of x where they are feedback Nash equilibrium. Then we conclude by arguing all x ∈ X are included in the procedure.
We iterate through all n s pairs of A p (k) and A c (k). For each k, we can solve for an affine policy u = K k x + s k with the feasible active inequalities A c (k) and the objective functions of all players as they constitute an instance of Problem 13. To find the region where this policy is indeed an FNE, we need to solve the corresponding optimality conditions
where S i,k means picking the rows of active inequalities in S i that are also in A p (k). The second condition (B.16) can be expressed with linear inequalities as in Appendix A.3, therefore the feasible region X k , if non-empty, is polyhedral, and u = K k x + s k is the FNE in this region. We omit the explicit expression here.
This procedure can be repeated ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n s }. For any x in X , we can find u (x) via a solver for monotone VI problems, find the active polyhedrons and active inequalities, therefore the k. The solution [x, u (x)] is covered by the condition (B.16) with k because they share the same local optimality condition. Note that such procedure may require exponentially many steps w.r.t. the number of polyhedrons and inequality constraints. 2
B.4 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
Now that we are equipped with some basic results, we can move on to dynamic games. A linearly constrained quadratic dynamic game is formulated as following. It is one of the most complicated form of dynamic games of which we can acquire analytical solution in theory. We briefly discuss the dynamic programming solution to such problems. The first static problem required to be solved by dynamic programming is a piecewise quadratic, resulting in a piecewise affine policy and piecewise quadratic value functions on X T , which is the space of x T . Based on the linear dynamics and constraints at step T − 1, we can form a polyhedral partition for [x T −1 , u T −1 ], resulting in the next static game to be a linearly constrained piecewise quadratic parametric game. As we have seen in Section B.2, the solution remains to be a piecewise affine policy and quadratic value functions. Therefore, the backward pass by dynamic programming can be done obtaining a series of piecewise quadratic value functions with linear inequality constraints. However, the number of partitions on each space X k can grow exponentially causing the procedure to be computationally prohibiting. It is reasonable to believe that the feedback Nash equilibrium of general constrained dynamic games can be more complex. This fact drives us to seek local FNE.
Problem 22 Linearly Constrained Quadratic Dynamic Games
